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Commentary on Jewish Marriage

Kethuboth 97b

AFTER HER BETROTHAL SHE MAY NOT SELL etc.?13 — It might have been presumed [that his ruling applied] Only to a woman widowed after [her] betrothal, since in her case there was not much affection,14 but that a divorced woman, in whose case there was much affection,15 may16 demand [the privilege of the provision for matrimonial] attraction.17 But have we not learned this18 also: WHO IS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE which includes,19 does it not, a divorced woman?20 — No, [it includes one who is both] divorced21 and' not divorced,22 as [the one spoken of by] R. Zera who stated: Wherever the Sages described a woman as both divorced and not divorced22 her husband is responsible for her maintenance.23

  1. After her marriage. It cannot refer to a woman divorced after her betrothal since her case could be inferred a minori ad majus from that of A WIDOW … AFTER HER BETROTHAL.
  2. After betrothal.
  3. One, for instance, to whom the husband has thrown a letter of divorce in a public thoroughfare and it is uncertain whether it fell nearer to her or to him (v. Git. 74a).
  4. Our. Mishnah thus teaches that the husband's responsibility for the maintenance of a woman in such circumstances ceases with his death, and his orphans, therefore, are under no obligation to maintain her out of his estate. She is well entitled to maintenance during his lifetime since it is through him that she is prevented from contracting a second marriage; but after his death, when she is free to marry again, her claim which was all the time of a doubtful nature must lapse.
 
Kethuboth 100b

MISHNAH. [A MINOR] WHO EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF MI'UN,48 A FORBIDDEN RELATIVE OF THE SECOND DEGREE,49 OR A WOMAN WHO IS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION IS NOT ENTITLED EITHER TO A KETHUBAH50 OR TO THE BENEFITS51 [OF HER MELOG48 PROPERTY]52 OR TO MAINTENANCE,53 OR TO HER WORN OUT ARTICLES.54 IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER AT THE OUTSET ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SHE WAS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION SHE IS ENTITLED TO A KETHUBAH. A WIDOW WHO WAS MARRIED TO A HIGH PRIEST,55 A DIVORCED WOMAN OR A HALUZAH48 WHO WAS MARRIED TO A COMMON PRIEST,56 A BASTARD OR A NETHINAH48 WHO WAS MARRIED TO AN ISRAELITE. OR THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS MARRIED TO A NATHIN,48 OR A BASTARD IS ENTITLED TO A KETHUBAH.57

Kethuboth 101a

IS NOT ENTITLED […] TO A KETHUBAH. Samuel stated: This was taught only in respect of the maneh45 and the two hundred zuz,'46 to the additional jointure,47 however, she48 is entitled. So it was also taught: The women concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They are not entitled to a kethubah' as, for instance, a minor who exercised the right of mi'un39 and the others enumerated in the same context,49 are not entitled to the maneh50 or to the two hundred zuz,51 but are entitled to their additional jointures; women, however, concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They may be divorced without [receiving their] kethubah' as, for instance, [a wife who] transgresses the [Mosaic] law, and others enumerated in the same context,52 are not entitled to their additional jointures47 and much less to [their statutory kethubahs of] a maneh50 or two hundred zuz;51 whilst a woman who is divorced on the ground of in repute53 takes only54 what is hers55 and departs. This56 provides support to R. Hunah who laid down: If she played the harlot [a wife] does not in consequence forfeit her worn out articles that are still in existence.
 
Babylonian Talmud Kethuboth 107b

The law is also in agreement with a ruling which R. Huna laid down in the name of Rab, R. Huna having stated on the authority of Rab: A wife is within her rights when she says to her husband, 'I desire no maintenance from, and refuse to do [any work for you]'.

Come and hear: In what circumstances was it laid down that [a minor who] exercised her right of refusal19 is not entitled to maintenance? It cannot be said, In [those of] one who lives with her husband, since [in such circumstances] her husband is under an obligation to maintain her, but [in those], for instance, [of one] whose husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she borrowed money and spent it20 and then21 exercised her right of refusal. Now, the reason [why she is not entitled to maintenance is obviously] because she exercised her right of refusal; had she, however, not exercised her right of refusal, maintenance would have been granted to her?22 — Samuel can answer you: What possibility need we provide against as far as she is concerned? If against that of23 [having been entrusted with] bundles of valuables [it may be pointed out that] no one entrusts a minor with valuables; and if against that of [the man's remission of] her handiwork24 [the fact is, it could be argued, that] the handiwork of a minor does not suffice [for her maintenance].25
 
Asterius of Amasea: Sermons (1904) pp. 130-157. Sermon 5: On Divorce


For, behold, marriage, the chief affair of human life, is regulated by him, and the limits of this union and the conditions of its dissolution are exactly determined. Let each one earnestly attend to the two ordinances of marriage, in order that women may be instructed as to their duties and men in the duties which belong to them.

"Whether it is lawful for a man to put away his wife for every reason?" This, then, is the problem of the Jews. I see the aim of their asking this question in the presence of the others. For since women are more ready to believe than men and are more susceptible to the magnificence of miracles, and inclined to the acceptance and belief of the divinity of Christ, (thus even behind the murderers who were dragging the Lord to the cross, was the multitude of women who bewailed his |137 sufferings, and, following the Saviour, piteously lamented him) 7 in order that they might lead him to offend and alienate all women, the Jews, by their crafty question, laid a trap and snare for him. But the Lord, through the power of his divinity, seeing what villainy they were devising, defeating their treachery, and, at the same time, laying down beneficent rules of life, makes reply, pleading the cause of women, and sending away empty those hungry wolves of Pharisees who in vain had snapped at him with their questions. "The creation itself," says he, "shows its aim to be union, not separation." The Creator was the first bestower of the bride in marriage, since he joined the first human beings in the marriage bond, giving to those who should come after, the inflexible ordinance of the conjugal life, which must be recognized as |138 the law of God; and they who are thus associated with one another are no longer two, but one flesh, so that" What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

These things were spoken to the Pharisees; but do you hear them now, you who do such things as these: you who change your wives as readily as your garments; who build bridal chambers as often and as easily as you build booths for feasts; who marry money, and deal in women; who if provoked a little immediately write a bill of divorcement; you who leave many widows while you are yet alive; believe me, marriage is terminated only by death or adultery. For it is not as in the case of mistresses, a companionship for a few days only, nor a mere quest for pleasure, but like most other things is subject to rule and regulation. But in marriage, O man, both soul and body are united, so that |139 disposition is mingled with disposition, and flesh with flesh. How, then, are you going to sever the bond of marriage without suffering? How can you withdraw from this union easily and without pain, after taking your sister and wife not as a servant of a few days, but as a partner for life, a sister by reason of her formation and creation,----for you were both made of the same element of earth and of the same substance,----and wife because of the conjugal union, because of the law of marriage? What sort of a bond, then, are you about to break, for you are bound by both law and nature; and how will you set at naught the agreements which you made at marriage? What sort of compacts do you think I mean? Those made when the dowry had been agreed upon, when with your own hand you signed the roll, and set your seal to the contract? These are strong indeed, |140 and possess stability enough, but I refer back to the utterance of Adam: "This is flesh of my flesh and bone of my bones, This shall be called my wife." 8 Not without reason is this utterance preserved in writing; for, uttered by the first man, it is the common covenant of men, made with the whole class of women, who are joined by law to their husbands. Do not be surprised if by what one has said, another is bound. For whatever happened in the beginning, in the case of those first created, has become the nature of their posterity.

If, then, the woman you have lightly divorced shall take the book of Genesis and drag you unto the Judge, who is both Judge and witness, tell me, what will you say? How will you repudiate your own utterance which you made in the name of |141 God, which Moses, the servant of God, recorded, instead of some cheap notary? God gave Adam a wife without father and without mother; and for this reason, as a guardian he shielded the orphan. But now daughters strongly assert their mothers' rights against their unfeeling and undutiful husbands. So that from every point of view it is impossible for you to slight your wife with impunity, bound as you are by the ancient laws of God and the modern laws of men.
 
Sketches of Jewish Life in the time of Christ

Alfred Edersheim. Chapter 9

On the other hand, a father was bound to provide a dowry (nedan, nedanjah) for his daughter conformable to her station in life; and a second daughter could claim a portion equal to that of her elder sister, or else one-tenth of all immovable property. In case of the father’s death, the sons, who, according to Jewish law, were his sole heirs, were bound to maintain their sisters, even though this would have thrown them upon public charity, and to endow each with a tenth part of what had been left. The dowry, whether in money, property, or jewellery, was entered into the marriage contract, and really belonged to the wife, the husband being obliged to add to it one-half more, if it consisted of money or money’s value; and if of jewellery, etc., to assign to her four-fifths of its value. In case of separation (not divorce) he was bound to allow her a proper aliment, and to re-admit her to his table and house on the Sabbath-eve. A wife was entitled to one-tenth of her dowry for pin-money. If a father gave away his daughter without any distinct statement about her dowry, he was bound to allow her at least fifty sus; and if it had been expressly stipulated that she was to have no dowry at all, it was delicately enjoined that the bridegroom should, before marriage, give her sufficient for the necessary outfit. An orphan was to receive a dowry of at least fifty sus from the parochial authorities. A husband could not oblige his wife to leave the Holy Land nor the city of Jerusalem, nor yet to change a town for a country residence, or vice versa, nor a good for a bad house. These are only a few of the provisions which show how carefully the law protected the interests of women. To enter into farther details would lead beyond our present object. All this was substantially settled at the betrothal, which, in Judaea at least, seems to have been celebrated by a feast. Only a bona fide breach of these arrangements, or wilful fraud, was deemed valid ground for dissolving the bond once formed. Otherwise, as already noted, a regular divorce was necessary. According to Rabbinical law certain formalities were requisite to make a betrothal legally valid. These consisted either in handing to a woman, directly or through messengers, a piece of money, however small, or else a letter, provided it were in each case expressly stated before witnesses, that the man thereby intended to espouse the woman as his wife.
 
Babylonian Talmud Kethuboth 52b

MISHNAH. [A HUSBAND WHO] DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE IN WRITING21 [THE FOLLOWING UNDERTAKING:] 'THE MALE CHILDREN THAT WILL BE BORN FROM OUR MARRIAGE22 SHALL INHERIT THE MONEY OF THY KETHUBAH IN ADDITION TO THEIR SHARES WITH THEIR BROTHERS',23 IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. [THOUGH HE DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE IN WRITING24 THE UNDERTAKING:] 'THE FEMALE CHILDREN THAT WILL BE BORN FROM OUR MARRIAGE25 SHALL DWELL IN MY HOUSE AND BE MAINTAINED OUT OF MY ESTATE UNTIL THEY SHALL BE TAKEN IN MAKRIAGE'26 HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. [SIMILARLY IF HE DID NOT GIVE HIS WIFE THE WRITTEN UNDERTAKING:]27 'YOU SHALL DWELL IN MY HOUSE AND BE MAINTAINED THEREIN OUT OF MY ESTATE THROUGHOUT THE DURATION OF YOUR WIDOWHOOD', HE IS NEVERTHELESS LIABLE, BECAUSE [THIS CLAUSE ALSO] IS A CONDITION LAID DOWN BY BETH DIN. SO DID THE MEN OF JERUSALEM WRITE. THE MEN OF GALILEE WROTE IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE MEN OF JERUSALEM. THE MEN OF JUDAEA, HOWEVER, USED TO WRITE:28 'UNTIL THE HEIRS MAY CONSENT TO PAY YOU YOUR KETHUBAH'. THE HEIRS, CONSEQUENTLY, MAY, IF THEY WISH TO DO IT, PAY HER HER KETHUBAH AND DISMISS HER.
 
Kethuboth 53b

R. Joseph learnt: [Daughters must be maintained] until they become [wives]. The question was raised: Does this19 mean becoming [wives] at marriage or becoming [wives] at betrothal? — The question must stand unanswered.20

Another reading:27 He28 replied: I have not actually heard it, but it may logically be concluded that she is entitled [to maintenance]; for [her intended husband], not being sure of her, would not throw his money away for nothing. The other29 retorted: If you have not actually heard this it may logically be concluded that she is not entitled to maintenance; because [her future husband], having betrothed her, would not allow her to be degraded. (Mnemonic of the men:30 SHaK ZaRaP.31 [Subjects:] She refused and a sister-in-law of the second degree is betrothed and he outraged her.)

R. Shesheth was asked: Is a minor who exercised her right of refusal32 entitled to maintenance33 or not?34 — You, replied R. Shesheth, have learned this: A widow35 in her father's house, a divorced woman35 in her father's house or a woman35 who was awaiting the decision of a levir36 in her father's house is entitled to maintenance. R. Judah ruled: [Only a woman who] is still in her father's house is entitled to maintenance but [a woman who] is no longer in her father's house is not entitled to maintenance. [Now is not] R. Judah's ruling exactly the same as that of the first Tanna?37 Consequently it may be concluded that38 the difference between them is the case of a minor who had exercised her right of refusal,39 the first Tanna being of the opinion that she is entitled [to maintenance]40 while R. Judah upholds the view that she is not entitled to it.41

Resh Lakish enquired: Is the daughter of a sister-in-law42 [.Whom the levir married in fulfilment of the law of the levirate marriage (v. Deut. XXV, 5).] entitled to maintenance43 or not? Has she no claim to it, since the Master said,44 Her kethubah is a charge on the estate of her first husband45 or is it possible that she is entitled to it since the Rabbis have enacted that whenever she46 is unable to collect her kethubah from [the estate of] the first, she may recover it from that of the second?47 — The question must remain unanswered.48
 
Kethuboth 65b

father has authority over his daughter in respect of her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, by deed or by intercourse; he is entitled to anything she finds and to her handiwork; [he has the right] of invalidating her vows, and he receives her letter of divorce; but he has no usufruct during her lifetime. When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime!48



Kethuboth 67b

Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan applied for assistance to marry,3 a house must be rented for him, a bed must be prepared for him and [he must also be supplied with] all [household] objects [required for] his use, and then he is given a wife in marriage, for it is said in Scriptures, Sufficient for his need in that which he wanteth:4 'sufficient for his need', refers to the house; 'in that which wanteth', refers to a bed and a table; 'he'5 refers to a wife, for so it is said in Scripture, I will make him5 a help meet unto him.6
 
Sketches of Jewish Life in the time of Christ. by Alfred Edersheim

Chapter 6 Jewish homes.

The Rabbinical ordinances, however, also specified the obligation of parents, and limited their power. Thus a son was considered independent whenever he could gain his own living; and, although a daughter remained in the power of her father till marriage, she could not, after she was of age, be given away without her own express and free consent. A father might chastise his child, but only while young, and even then not to such extent as to destroy self-respect. But to beat a grown-up son was forbidden on pain of excommunication; and the apostolic injunction (Eph 6: 4), “Fathers, provoke not your children to wrath,” finds almost its literal counterpart in the Talmud (Moed K. 17 a). Properly speaking, indeed, the Jewish law limited the absolute obligation of a father (a mother was free from such legal obligation) to feed, clothe, and house his child to his sixth year, after which he could only be admonished to it as one of the duties of love, but not legally constrained (Chethub. 49 b; 65 b). In case of separation of the parents, the mother had charge of the daughters, and the father of the sons; but the latter also might be intrusted to the mother, if the judges considered it for the advantage of the children.

Chapter 9

We read in the Gospel that, when the Virgin-mother “was espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost. Then Joseph her husband, being a just man, and not willing to make her a public example, was minded to put her away privily” (Matt 1: 18, 19). The narrative implies a distinction between betrothal and marriage —Joseph being at the time betrothed, but not actually married to the Virgin-mother. Even in the Old Testament a distinction is made between betrothal and marriage. The former was marked by a bridal present (or Mohar, Gen 34: 12; Exo 22: 17; 1 Sam 18: 25), with which the father, however, would in certain circumstances dispense. From the moment of her betrothal a woman was treated as if she were actually married. The union could not be dissolved, except by regular divorce; breach of faithfulness was regarded as adultery; and the property of the women became virtually that of her betrothed, unless he had expressly renounced it (Kidd. ix. 1). But even in that case he was her natural heir. It is impossible here to enter into the various legal details, as, for example, about property or money which might come to a woman after betrothal or marriage. The law adjudicated this to the husband, yet with many restrictions, and with infinite delicacy towards the woman, as if reluctant to put in force the rights of the stronger (Kidd. viii. 1, etc.). From the Mishnah (Bab. B. x. 4) we also learn that there were regular Shitre Erusin, or writings of betrothal, drawn up by the authorities (the costs being paid by the bridegroom). These stipulated the mutual obligations, the dowry, and all other points on which the parties had agreed. The Shitre Erusin were different from the regular Chethubah (literally, writing), or marriage contract, without which the Rabbis regarded a marriage as merely legalised concubinage (Cheth. v. 1). The Chethubah provided a settlement of at least two hundred denars for a maiden, and one hundred denars for a widow, while the priestly council at Jerusalem fixed four hundred denars for a priest’s daughter. Of course these sums indicate only the legal minimum, and might be increased indefinitely at pleasure, though opinions differ whether any larger sums might be legally exacted, if matters did not go beyond betrothal. The form at present in use among the Jews sets forth, that the bridegroom weds his bride “according to the law of Moses and of Israel”; that he promises “to please, to honour, to nourish, and to care for her, as is the manner of the men of Israel,” adding thereto the woman’s consent, the document being signed by two witnesses. In all probability this was substantially the form in olden times. In Jerusalem and in Galilee —where it was said that men in their choice had regard to “a fair degree,” while in the rest of Judaea they looked a good deal after money —widows had the right of residence in their husband’s house secured to them.



On the other hand, a father was bound to provide a dowry (nedan, nedanjah) for his daughter conformable to her station in life; and a second daughter could claim a portion equal to that of her elder sister, or else one-tenth of all immovable property. In case of the father’s death, the sons, who, according to Jewish law, were his sole heirs, were bound to maintain their sisters, even though this would have thrown them upon public charity, and to endow each with a tenth part of what had been left. The dowry, whether in money, property, or jewellery, was entered into the marriage contract, and really belonged to the wife, the husband being obliged to add to it one-half more, if it consisted of money or money’s value; and if of jewellery, etc., to assign to her four-fifths of its value. In case of separation (not divorce) he was bound to allow her a proper aliment, and to re-admit her to his table and house on the Sabbath-eve. A wife was entitled to one-tenth of her dowry for pin-money. If a father gave away his daughter without any distinct statement about her dowry, he was bound to allow her at least fifty sus; and if it had been expressly stipulated that she was to have no dowry at all, it was delicately enjoined that the bridegroom should, before marriage, give her sufficient for the necessary outfit. An orphan was to receive a dowry of at least fifty sus from the parochial authorities. A husband could not oblige his wife to leave the Holy Land nor the city of Jerusalem, nor yet to change a town for a country residence, or vice versa, nor a good for a bad house. These are only a few of the provisions which show how carefully the law protected the interests of women. To enter into farther details would lead beyond our present object. All this was substantially settled at the betrothal, which, in Judaea at least, seems to have been celebrated by a feast. Only a bona fide breach of these arrangements, or wilful fraud, was deemed valid ground for dissolving the bond once formed. Otherwise, as already noted, a regular divorce was necessary. According to Rabbinical law certain formalities were requisite to make a betrothal legally valid. These consisted either in handing to a woman, directly or through messengers, a piece of money, however small, or else a letter, provided it were in each case expressly stated before witnesses, that the man thereby intended to espouse the woman as his wife.



According to Jewish law there were four obligations incumbent on a wife towards her husband, and ten by which he was bound. Of the latter, three are referred to in Exodus 21: 9, 10; the other seven include her settlement, medical treatment in case of sickness, redemption from captivity, a respectable funeral, provision in his house so long as she remained a widow and had not been paid her dowry, the support of her daughters till they were married, and a provision that her sons should, besides receiving their portion of the father’s inheritance, also share in what had been settled upon her. The obligations upon the wife were, that all her gains should belong to her husband, as also what came to her after marriage by inheritance; that the husband should have the usufruct of her dowry, and of any gains by it, provided he had the administration of it, in which case, however, he was also responsible for any loss; and that he should be considered her heir-at-law.
 
I’m sure I’ve got more info somewhere as I have time to find it.

In these passages and more, the rights listed as matrimonial rights in Exodus 21:10 are all for a wife, never for a slave. In each case, the wife’s maintenance and matrimonial duties were grounds for her to go free or demand a writing of divorcement because the breaking of these stipulations was evidence of a sham marriage generated by fraud on the “husbands” part.
 
PLEASE Note! This thread is for discussion of this topic re Old Testament Jewish marriage customs and laws. I don’t mind discussing divorce post Christ, but that will need to be done on another thread.

Due to a recent death in the family and more on my plate than I have time for at the moment, I probably wont be able to give this the attention that the thread probably deserves, but I will clean it up if it gets derailed.

Thanks.
 
@Verifyveritas76

Oral.

Tradition.

Tell me about maintaining a sound oral tradition all the way to Moses even though the written Torah that had been lost was found during Josiah's reign and I'll believe in Santa Claus.

A major problem is that the Talmud governs how Judaism understands the Torah and is held in higher regard, objections be damned. When you read the Word through a filter, whether Talmud or Christian commentaries, you'll get some good stuff and you'll get some poison, but you'll soon not be able to tell the difference.

So, here's the question: how many falsehoods do you need me to show you in the Talmud for us to agree that it is an unreliable witness? Give me a number.

Peace.
 
For the record, I do not consider Jewish commentary to be inspired, rather a historical record and in the case of the BT, a historical legal record. It’s literally the equivalent of someone 2300 years from now, examining the Federalist papers to better understand the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution.
 
@Verifyveritas76

Oral.

Tradition.

Tell me about maintaining a sound oral tradition all the way to Moses even though the written Torah that had been lost was found during Josiah's reign and I'll believe in Santa Claus.

A major problem is that the Talmud governs how Judaism understands the Torah and is held in higher regard, objections be damned. When you read the Word through a filter, whether Talmud or Christian commentaries, you'll get some good stuff and you'll get some poison, but you'll soon not be able to tell the difference.
So, here's the question: how many falsehoods do you need me to show you in the Talmud for us to agree that it is an unreliable witness? Give me a number.

Peace.

@Ancient Paths, What is the difference, if any between imperfect and unreliable? In any commentary, there will be imperfections. Does this make the commentary worthless? Or simply something that must be carefully examined?

Do you know of any other in depth perfect reference or commentary to the ins and outs of the Jewish Culture? I’m totally open to that.

Or are you saying that the docs presented have something wrong with them simply because there are errors elsewhere unrelated to this topic and passage?

Obviously, I don’t want this thread derailed into a in-depth expose of the entire Talmud, as I want it to be focused on the Exodus 21 passage.

For the record, I do not believe that the Oral existed unbroken clear back to Moses, or that either Talmud (Jerusalem or Babylonian) is perfect or inspired. I accept that there may be errors or biases in them just like any other secular references.

IMO these docs aren’t inspired, but they are certainly enlightening re Jewish cultures around and before the time of Christ.
 
I'm a little confused or I missed something in all those posts, you don't want to discuss marriage post-Christ but we're still talking about the Talmud right? It is post-Christ. So is your basic claim that although Exodus 21 specifically restricts itself to purchased women you believe it should be expanded to all women because of the Talmud right?
 
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So is your basic claim that although Exodus 21 specifically restricts itself to purchased women you believe it should be expanded to all women because of the Talmud right?

No. That is not correct.

1 Exodus 21:10 does not specifically restrict itself to purchased women. This idea is read into verse 10 because of the transition from a bond maid or indentured maid to a wife. Though the previous verses deal with a girl who was a bond maid (not a slave because a Hebrew could not be a slave to another Hebrew), verse 10 is not about a slave but a wife.

This is obvious from the association of rights. IF he take another . . . Another what? Another slave? Or Another wife? The distinction is made and the status is clarified by the rights guaranteed to her. A bond maid or even a bond servant did not have the right to food and clothing that I am aware of. No doubt they were taken care of, but I’m not aware that it was a right. They certainly did not have the right to marital duties and weren’t allowed to go free if they weren’t provided.
On the other hand, a wife did have the right to all three. Thus, the passage is not granting a slave special privileges that a free born wife was not entitled to, but rather ensuring that a bond maid that was made a concubine (without a ketubah) was afforded the same protections that a ketubahed wife was guaranteed.

These three rights were un- alienable. They were intrinsic to a wife and she could not be alienated from these basic rights even if she signed them away. All Jewish marriages were presumed to be founded upon Torah. Torah guaranteed these rights even to a bond maid that had no one to negotiate and ensure these basic rights for her.

It’s the question of the egg or the chicken. Which came first? The Babylonian Talmud Kethuboth was not an attempt to create Jewish culture, but an attempt to ensure that their culture and its logic was preserved for future generations.
The utility of the Babylonian Talmud Kethuboth is not to prove that it should be expanded to all women, but it certainly proves that they believed that these rights had been intrinsic and unalienable to all wives since antiquity, bond or free.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_views_on_marriage
 
1 Exodus 21:10 does not specifically restrict itself to purchased women. This idea is read into verse 10 because of the transition from a bond maid or indentured maid to a wife. Though the previous verses deal with a girl who was a bond maid (not a slave because a Hebrew could not be a slave to another Hebrew), verse 10 is not about a slave but a wife.

If this is correct (which I’m not certain it is but I’m still working through it in my own study) why do you need the Talmud? If that’s what the passage means then that’s what it means. No need for the extra biblical documents to support the claim...
 
Also I’d be curious which word is used in verse 10 translated into English as wife. My understanding is that there is no word for wife in the Hebrew. I’m actually curious if it was possibly even added in English for clarity... Even the word for marriage in that verse seems to be the only time it’s used in the Bible. And it’s defined as

marriage
Brown-Driver-Briggs' Definition
  1. cohabitation, conjugal rights
 
If this is correct (which I’m not certain it is but I’m still working through it in my own study) why do you need the Talmud? If that’s what the passage means then that’s what it means. No need for the extra biblical documents to support the claim...

It is easy to read a bias into certain passages, particularly when coming from a foreign culture and trying to understand it based upon our own Roman /Western culture. This particular tractate is focused on Jewish family life. My whole point with this is to use these extra biblical docs and commentary to show that this error comes from a biased interpretation of the passage, not from the intent or actual wording of the passage. If this passage was used then to specifically restrict these rights to concubines, there would not be universal application to all wives within the host culture in succeeding generations. If there had been some drastic expansion, these rabbi’s would have had a field day with it and it would have been prominently debated. I don’t think Ive found another group that loved to argue the minutia more than these guys . . . . Except maybe here at Bib Families.:eek:

Another great resource I’ve quoted from is Alfred Edersheim. You can find his works here very reasonably priced. https://www.amazon.com/Alfred-Edersheim/e/B000APBA40?ref=dbs_a_def_awm_hsch_vu00_tkin_p1_i5

He is the author of such works as these and is best known for his book The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah.
Bio here https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Edersheim
 
Alright, you've got a couple of problems. The first is that an Israelite, remember that "Jew" wasn't a thing when the Law was given, can most certainly be a slave to an Israelite an even a permanent slave if he decides to stay and his master pierces his ear against the door post. And don't forget that the Law was given assuming that there would be no foreigners in the land. They would all be Israelite. The biggest problem though is your jump from having the passage referring to slave girls to talking about regular wives. That's just not there. You have to cut sentences in half basically. That's just too far of a stretch. Keep in mind as well that a case could be made that this slave girl that has been purchased may not even be one he has slept with. The language would apply to a regular slave girl in my understanding. It just really feels like you're trying to work backwards from a desired result.
On an unrelated note, if the slavegirl is a wife what does that do for the whole "covenant marriage" idea? She was bought not even knowing if she would be a wife and if so who to. That's a pretty sketchy covenant. I digress though.
So it seems that the question at hand is whether we can find a subject jump in Exodus 21 from talking about a slave girl to a "regular" wife so we can show that said "regular" wife can leave her husband if he reduces her portion in order to take a new wife AND THEN after all are we going to find a way to take the second wife out of it so we can show that any wife can leave a husband for non-povidence even if he never gave her a greater portion that he then reduced?
You see the challenge ahead of you right? Even if you get the slave girl out of it you still have the whole passage tied to a plural marriage ane a reduction of current portion. A sultan's wife could qualify and the wife of an abusive drunkard who never worked a day in his life wouldn't. I admire your ambition and dogged determination but you are never going to be able to get Exodus 21 to tell an honest woman she can leave her husband for nonprovidence. A dishonesr woman doesn't care anyway so there really is no need to exhaust yourself over this.
 
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